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cannot be achieved under state legislation because of the contracts clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution.. 6
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Three-Year Residence Requirement for
Poor Relief-[Illinois].-The Illinois Pauper's Act was amended in 1939 to provide
that no local governmental unit shall provide relief to any person who did not "reside
therein for a period of three years immediately preceding his application for relief and
support."' The relators, most of whom had been in the state for the required period,
but who were refused relief by the Chicago relief authorities because they could not
meet the local residence requirement, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the au-
thorities to give them relief. The relators challenged the constitutionality of the act
under the due process and equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitu-
tions as establishing an arbitrary classification. Held, that the classification is not
arbitrary since it is a reasonable means to prevent the burden to the state relief system
of a continued inflow of indigent families from other states. Writ denied. People ex rel.
Heydenreicts v. Lyons.2
The underlying justification for upholding the classification based on the three-year
local residence requirement is that the state, being under no constitutional or common
law duty to provide relief to indigents,3 has wide discretion in imposing conditions of
eligibility for poor relief.4 In stating that the residence requirement bears a reasonable
relation to the legislative intent of assuring relief to resident indigents by discouraging
the immigration of indigents from other states,5 the court failed to distinguish the
intrastate from the interstate aspects of the relief problem. A state residence require-
ment would have been sufficient to prevent an influx of non-residents; the local resi-
dence requirement, which is no greater protection against that danger, has the serious
economic effect of restricting to local communities the area within which indigent
families might freely move. The intrastate aspect of the statute was mentioned only
with the brief remark that the amendment was simultaneously intended to relieve local
gested that mortgage payments be made adjustable to current incomes for large groups of
borrowers. Wickens, Adjusting the Mortgagor's Obligation to Economic Cycles, 5 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 617 (1938). The suggestion is similar to the proposal for "all equity" financing
in the case of corporations.
26 Even though many states have deficiency judgment acts which require the fair value of the
mortgaged property to be applied in diminution of the debt (e.g., see the North Carolina
statute upheld in Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co.,
3ooU.S. 127 (i937)), in no state is it possible for the mortgagor to require a "scaling down" of
the debt so as to prevent the mortgagee from taking over the land.
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 107, § i6.
2 374 Ill. 557, 3o N.E. (2d) 46 (I94O). Rehearing den. Dec. to, i94o.
3 Holland v. Cedar Grove, 230 Wis. 177, 282 N.W. 11 (1939); Cerro Gordo v. Boone, 152
Iowa 672, 133 N.W. 132 (i1).
4 The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions may possibly impose some limitations on this
discretion. Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law 557 (1939).
s 374 Ill. 557, 566, 3o N.E. (2d) 46, 52 (1940).
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communities of the relief burden of other communities. Intrastate migration might, in
the absence of this legislation, result from the existence of varying relief rates in differ-
ent communities.6 The intrastate aspects of the relief problem, however, decrease in
importance as state funds bear more of the burden. In 194o local funds paid only about
27 per cent of the total relief burden, state grants supplying the remainder.7
The relators also attacked the requirement that the period of residence immediately
precede the application for relief. In this respect the Illinois provision differs from
the usual type, which requires merely that to be eligible for relief, i.e., to have acquired
a "settlement," 8 one must have resided in the relief-giving unit for the required period.9
The general "common law" policy was that no person should be without a settlement.
Thus it was held, as to intrastate migration, that a settlement was not lost until an-
other settlement was acquired within the state. 0 A split of authority existed as to
6 In May, 194o, the monthly allowance per family unit ranged from $17.51 in southern
Illinois communities to $6o.o9 in northern communities. Jacoby, An Analysis of Migration and
Relief in Illinois 22 (pamphlet, 194o).
Ibid., at 21.
8 Delaware L. & W.R. Co. v. Petrowsky, 25o Fed. 554, 562 (C.C.A. 2d 1918); Smiley v. St.
Hilaire, 183 Minn. 533, 536, 237 N.W. 416, 418 (1931).
9 In 1939, eighteen states had residence requirements of more than one year; in only two
were they shorter than one year. Twenty-two states had one-year periods. The remainder had
no provision. Am. Pub. Welfare Ass'n, Compilation of Settlement Laws of All States in the
United States (1939).
Only a few states besides Illinois require that the period of residence immediately precede
the application for relief. Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) c. 70, § 1I7a; Idaho L. 1939, c. 270, § 18;
2 Pa. L. 1937, No. 399, § 9d.
Prior to the present amendment, Illinois did not require a fixed period of residence as a
condition to poor relief. The law simply provided that local relief units should grant relief to
persons lawfully resident therein. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937) c. 107, §§ 14, 14a, 15.1. Residence was
defined as "the actual residence of the party, or the place where he was employed, or in case he
was in no employment, it shall be considered and held to be the place where he made it his
home." [sic] Ibid., § 17. Section 16 provided that among Illinois communities the burden of
supporting a pauper should finally rest not upon the community in which he resided when he
became a pauper, but upon the one wherein he resided at the commencement of an immediately
preceding twelve-month period. The text of the statute did not seem to require any period of
residence in the community thus charged with the final burden.
Under the new law, the community in which a person applies for relief is bound, if the
applicant has not resided therein for three years immediately preceding his application for
relief, to take steps to place the relief burden on that Illinois community, if any, wherein the
person has so resided. Such community must pay the community in which the pauper applied
for relief any charges incurred for support and transportation of the pauper. Ill. Rev. Stat.
(1939) c. 107, § 6. Furthermore, residence is now defined as the local relief unit "in which
person has made his permanent home for a continuous period of three years, preceding his
becoming chargeable as a pauper." Ibid., § 17. These provisions become understandable in
the light of the instant decision in which the court stated that residence does not necessarily
imply physical presence, but depends on the intention of the person who is, for the time being,
not present at his place of domicile.
10 In re Leslie, 166 Minn. 18o, 207 N.W. 323 (1926); Payne v. Dunham, 29 Ill. 125 (1862);
Manchester v. Springfield, 15 Vt. 385 (1843).
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whether a settlement was lost by the acquisition of a settlement in another state."
Today some statutes provide that settlement is lost upon the expiration of a fixed
period of residence outside the place of settlement, irrespective of whether or not a
new settlement has been acquired.12
The relators' argument of discrimination was based on the premise that the act
forbade relief to Illinois residents who had sought temporary employment in other
communities and states while allowing relief to other indigents who had remained idle
in one community. The court disposed of this contention by holding residence to be
determined by intention, not merely by physical presence, thus allowing relief clients
to seek temporary employment elsewhere without losing their settlement if they have
no intention sufficient to establish a new domicile elsewhere.'3
In practice, however, any rule based on intention, which may be inferred from
physical acts, may justifiably lead relief clients to be reluctant to make any physical
change of residence out of the community in which they have a settlement. The Illi-
nois provision, therefore, seems inferior to a provision making loss of settlement turn
not on intent, but on a fixed period of residence outside the place of settlement.4
In addition to the requirement of a long period of residence, the statute contains
another provision which may be used to reduce the relief burden of any locality and
of the state. Section r6a provides that the local unit bound to support an indigent may,
in lieu of support, transport him to the state wherein he last resided. Since this pro-
vision does not purport to be an expulsion measure, it seems to be only an authoriza-
tion to relief authorities to spend relief funds for such purpose,s and it is apparently
not operative over the objection of an indigent.' 6 Furthermore, it seems that relief
" That such acquisition does not cause loss of prior settlement: Payne v. Dunham, 29 Ill.
125 (1862); Peterborough v. Lancaster, 14 N.H. 382 (x843); Alexandria v. Kingwood, 8
N. J. L. 370 (1826); Townsend v. Billerica, 1oMass. 419 (183). That such acquisition results
in loss of prior settlement: Exeter v. Richmond, 6 R.I. 149 (1859); Bethlem v. Roxbury, 20
Conn. 297 (185o).
" Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c. i16, § S; N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1938) c. 7, § 53;
R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 68, § i.
'3 The interpretation of "residence" as "domicile" rather than mere physical presence seems
general. Plainville v. Milford, ii9 Conn. 380, 177 Atl. z38 (1935); Georgia v. Waterville,
107 Vt. 347, 178 Atl. 893 (1935); Dorr v. Seneca, 74 Ill. 'o (1874).
'4 See note 1 2 supra. The Arizona statute, having a three-year residence requirement similar
to that of Illinois, has a provision permitting temporary absence not exceeding one year during
the three-year period. Ariz. Code Ann. (939) c. 70, § 117(b). The Arizona statute also dis-
tinguishes between interstate and intrastate migration, requiring only a six-month continuous
residence immediately preceding the application for relief in the county in which application is
made. Ibid., § 117(a).
'5 New York has a statute providing for forcible expulsion of indigents. N.Y. Cons. Laws
(McKinney, 1939) c. 42, § 71. Such expulsion can apparently be made only to a state (or
country) where the indigent has a settlement. It seems probable that the Court of Appeals will
uphold the constitutionality of the act when the question is properly presented. Cf. In re
Chirillo, 283 N.Y. 417, 28 N.E. (2d) 895 (i94o), where the court refused to hear the constitu-
tional question because of failure to follow the New York Civil Practice Act in presenting the
appeal. Finch, J., dissenting, said the question should be considered and produced authority
upholding the statute.
16 Ops. Att'y Gen'l of Ill. (1939) 175. Even removal statutes will be construed in favor of
the pauper. Emmet v. Dally, 216 Iowa i66, 248 N.W. 366 (1933)-
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funds can be used for an indigent's transportation only after the indigent has become
eligible for relief; they cannot be used to prevent such acquisition.
Several other problems concerning eligibility for relief remain unsettled under the
amendment. Must a person reside within the local unit without any relief for the three-
year period in order to gain a settlement? Most states expressly provide that during
the period of residence necessary to obtain state relief a person must not be in receipt
of relief from other public agencies;7 some states disallow relief from either public or
private agencies."8 The question is significant because federal relief'9 or private chari-
table relief is granted to indigents residing within Illinois communities. A related prob-
lem is whether persons eligible under the former law and in fact receiving relief will be
deprived of relief if they cannot satisfy the new residence requirement. Although no
question of vested rights is involved, the act ought not to be given a retroactive effect.20
The immediate effect of the Illinois amendment is to place a heavy burden upon
private charity, which is already overburdened.!! Because the act hampers interstate
as well as intrastate migration,!2 other states may enact retaliatory legislation.23 The
effect upon interstate migration appears to be economically undesirable4 Moreover,
it is said that rigorous settlement requirements tend in practice to effect a hardship
on the honest poor who seek work, while persons with a pauper spirit are able to secure
a living without work.2s
'7 E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws (Mason, Supp. 1935) § 8255; N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney,
1930) c. 42, § 56.
X8 Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1940) § 3479; NJ. Rev. Stat. (1938) tit. 44, c. 4, §57;
Iowa Code (1939) § 3828.088(3).
19 Employment on federal works projects is considered relief. In re Youngs, 172 Misc.
155, 14 N.Y.S. (2d) 8oo (N.Y. City Cts. 1939).
20 In re Opinion of the Justices, 89 N.H. 563, 198 At. 249 (1938); Guilford v. New Haven,
56 Conn. 465, z6 At. 240 (r888); Lawrence v. Methuen, 187 Mass. 592, 73 N.E. 86o (r9o5).
21 See United Charities of Chicago Bulletin No. 226, Aug. 14, 1940.
2 It is difficult to estimate the influence of relief availability upon migration. Relief does
not appear to be a dominant factor in causing migration. Webb, The Transient Unemployed
58, ri7 (WPA Division of Social Research, Monograph III, 1935). However, other things
being equal, it may be the consideration which determines whether or not a migration occurs.
Jacoby, An Analysis of Relief and Migration in Illinois (pamphlet, 194o). The level of relief, as
well as its availability, is also of importance in inducing migration. See In re Chirillo, 283 N.Y.
417, 433, 28 N.E. (2d) 895, 902 (1940).
'3 In 1932, only nine states had residence requirements longer than one year. Hirsch, Com-
pilation of Settlement Laws of All the States of the United States (1933). Today there are
eighteen states with requirements greater than one year. See note 9 supra.
'4 From the point of view of the nation as a whole the migration of destitute citizens appears
not any less desirable than the migration of self-supporting citizens, providing the former are
governed by the same motives as the latter ana act on the best available information. Jacoby,
An Analysis of Relief and Migration in Illinois 7 (pamphlet, 194o); Ashchrott, English Poor
Law System 9-13 (2d ed. 1902). Smith, The Wealth of Nations bk. I, i4o-4i (Cannan ed.
1937).
as Gillen, Poor Relief Legislation in Iowa 124-25 (1914). For examples of hardships in-
flicted by the recent Illinois amendment see 14 Social Serv. Rev. 347 (i94O). Note that this
argument was used by the relators in the principal case to support their contention of uncon-
stitutional discrimination. 374 Ill. 557, 561 30 N.E. (2d) 46, 50 (1940).
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Action on a national scale seems necessary in order to remedy a situation already
nation-wide in scope? 6 The grant-in-aid method or a system of interstate compacts
might be used to induce the states to adopt uniform requirements for relief. Under the
provisions adopted no residence of more than one year should be required, and no
settlement should be lost until a new one is obtained. Moreover, acceptance of federal
assistance should not be permitted to disqualify a migrant from acquiring a settlement,
since relief may be necessary until the migrant family establishes itself in the com-
munity. In order to make migration intelligent, information bureaus are necessary
to make knowledge of employment opportunities more readily available and to pre-
vent the dissemination of inaccurate information.
If, on the other hand, a system of direct federal relief for non-settled migrants is
instituted, care should be taken to avoid two standards of relief, federal and state, in
the same jurisdiction. Either direct federal relief or grants-in-aid and interstate com-
pacts would probably not prevent variations in relief levels among the states and the
effect of such variations in influencing migration.
Constitutional Law-Fair Labor Standards Act-Industry Committee Procedure in
Recommending Minimum Wages-[Federal.-The petitioner, a small cotton textile
manufacturer subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act, sued in the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit to set aside the administrator's order fixing a 322 cent hourly
minimum wage for the textile industry. The petitioner argued first, that the act was
unconstitutional, and second, that even if it were constitutional, the administrator had
not complied with the statute. On writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court to the cir-
cuit court, which had dismissed the petitioner's complaint, held, that Congress had
power to regulate wages and hours in industries engaged in production for interstate
commerce, that the administrator had complied with the act in appointing the industry
committee and in upholding its findings, and that the administrative procedure set up
in the act did not deny petitioner his right to a fair hearing nor involve an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power. judgment affirmed. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v.
Adm'r of the Wage and Hour Division of the Dept. of Labor.'
Since the Supreme Court in United States v. Darby Lumber Co.2 held that under the
commerce power Congress could prohibit employment of workmen engaged in the
production of goods for interstate commerce and the shipment of the goods in such
commerce when the men worked under substandard conditions,3 the statutory pro-
26For a discussion of possible remedies see Ohio State Transient Committee, Summary of
Conditions in Ohio in regard to Interstate Migration of Destitute Citizens ii-r4 (1940);
Council of State Governments, A Survey of the Present Status of the Problem of the Transient
and State Settlement Laws (1938); Ryan, Migration and Social Welfare c. 7 (I94O); Jacoby,
An Analysis of Relief and Migration in Illinois I1, 25-26 (pamphlet, 194o).
61 S. Ct. 524 (194). 2 61 S. Ct. 45x (I94i).
3 The Supreme Court expressly overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918),
which invalidated the Child Labor Act of 1916. For a discussion on the constitutionality of
the Fair Labor Standards Act see, Constitutional Aspects of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
I938, 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. or (1939); The Fair Labor Standards Act: The Evils and Burdens
in Interstate Commerce, 25 Va. L. Rev. 341 (1939); The Fair Labor Standards Act, i6 N.Y.
U. L. Q. 454 (1939); Stern and Smethurst, How the Supreme Court May View the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 6 Law & Contemp. Prob. 431 (1939).
